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This  paper provides  new evidence on the determinants  of environmental expenditure and 
investment. Also, by employing the Heckman selection models, we study how environmental 
expenditure  and  investment  by  Swedish  industrial  firms  responded  to  the  national  and 
international policies directed to mitigate air pollution during the period 1999 through 2008. 
We find that firms that use carbon intensive fuels such as oil and gas are more likely to spend 
to and invest in the environment. Larger, more profitable and more energy intensive firms are 
more likely to incur environmental expenditure/investment. Overall, an important finding of 
our  econometric  analysis  is  that  environmental  regulation  both  on  the  national  and 
international  levels  are  highly  relevant  motivations  for  environmental  expenditure  and 
investment. 






1.  Introduction 
Sweden has been a leader in protecting its environment through introducing new legislation, 
stepping  up  enforcement,  and  encouraging  community  involvement  to  promote  an 
environment-friendly  culture.  In  the  last  two  decades,  the  particular  focus  has  been  on 
mitigating  air  pollution  in  industry.  Apart  from  traditional  energy/excise  taxes  levied  on 
energy products in the early 1990s, the Swedish government introduced CO2 taxes (1991), 
SO2 taxes (1991), and a NOx charge (1992). Sweden, being the member of the European 
Union,  is  also  subject  to the European  regulation, in  particular, to  the European Union’s 
Emission Trading System (2005). Due to these regulations on the national and international 
levels the emissions of CO2, SO2, and NOx have significantly decreased since 1990.  
As abatement cost increases with the stringency of environmental policy, regulation has most 
certainly been a large factor in driving changes in production processes and investments to 
mitigate pollution. Unregulated firms may also decide to acquire and install less polluting 
capital technology equipment if it lowers their production cost. In addition, the fact that more 
firms integrate social, environmental and economic concerns into their values and operations 
and consumers becoming “greener” are likely to be another contributing factor.  
Given the significant regulatory burden on firms to abate pollution and the resultant costs in 
Sweden, it is natural to wonder whether corporate environmental expenditure and investment 
is a response to these pressures or to other factors. Therefore the main goal of this paper is to 
explore  the  determinants  of  environmental  expenditure  and  investment  in  the  entire 
manufacturing sector in Sweden during the period 1999-2008. The available dataset allows us 
to  examine  several  types  of  environmental  expenditure:  first  we  look  at  firm’s  current 
expenditure  for  environmental  protection  which  includes  all  other  costs  of  environmental 
protection that are not considered to be investment, second we consider firm’s investment in 
environmental  protection,  and  finally  we  analyse  current  environmental  protection 
expenditure on research and development (R&D). For this purpose we employ a selection 
model which allows first examining which factors are the determinants of whether any such 
expenditure occurs  and  in  a second step we explain how much is  spent on each type of 
expenditure given that it occurs.  
Most  of  the  earlier  empirical  literature  has  focused  on  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of 
environmental policies. The later focus has been on effects of environmental regulations on 
environmental investment, innovation and technological change. For instance, the relationship 
between  environmental  policy  stringency  and  innovation  efforts  has  been  demonstrated 
empirically  by  Lanjouw  and  Mody  (1996),  Jaffe  and  Palmer  (1997),  Brunnermeiera  and 
Cohen  (2003),  Horbach  (2008)  and  Carrion-Flores  and  Innes  (2010)  where  increases  in 
pollution abatement control expenditures (assumed to be correlated to policy stringency) lead 
to jumps in environmental patent counts and/or R&D expenditure. Horbach (2008) also finds 
that  environmentally  innovative  firms  in  the  past  are  also  more  likely  to  innovate  in  the 
present. Lee and Alm (2004) look at the impact of uncertainties surrounding the enactment 
and  the  enforcement  of  environmental  legislation  on  firm’s  investment  in  air  pollution 
abatement equipment.  3 
 
Also, there is growing evidence that firms respond to other external pressures for voluntary 
overcompliance  such  as  local/interest  group  pressures,  customer  demand  or  other  social 
pressures  (see  e.g.  Heal  (2008)).  In  addition  to  that,  the  standard  industrial  organisation 
literature  has  stressed  the  importance  of  firm  characteristics,  such  as  firm  size,  firm 
ownership,  foreign  competition,  technological  characteristics,  capital  intensity  and  others, 
when explaining investment in general. For example, the attention to firm-specific factors 
when  explaining  environmental  expenditure  has  been  given  by  Collins  and  Harris  (2002, 
2005) and Haller and Murphy (2012). (Collins and Harris 2002; Collins and Harris 2005) 
Our paper contributes to the sparse empirical literature on interactions between environmental 
regulation  and  corporate  behaviour.  Unlike  previous  studies,  we  exploit  a  comprehensive 
survey  of  environmental  expenditure  and  investment  for  a  quite  long  time  period.  Our 
empirical results show that firms that use carbon intensive fuels such as oil and gas are more 
likely to spend to and invest in the environment. Larger, more profitable and more energy 
intensive firms are more likely to incur environmental expenditure/investment. Overall, an 
important finding of our econometric analysis is that environmental regulation both on the 
national  and  international  levels  are  highly  relevant  motivations  for  environmental 
expenditure and investment. 
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. We present our theoretical framework and 
define the variables to be used in our empirical analysis in Section 2. In Section 3 we outline 
the  data  sources.  Our  empirical  findings  are  discussed  in  Section  4.  The  final  section 
highlights the contributions of this paper and concludes.  
 
2.  Empirical strategy 
The  empirical  problem  of  our  study  is  to  find  the  determinants  of  firm  environmental 
expenditure and investment. A number of econometric issues need to be tackled. First, we 
might  have  sample  selection  bias  since  our  dependent  variable  (the  environmental 
expenditure/investment  level)  can  be  measured  only  if  the  individual  firm  decides  to  do 
expenditure/investment. The Heckman selection model (1979) can be used to deal with this 
problem. Second, the Heckman sample selection model is more commonly used in studies 
with cross-section data and less with panel data. Wooldridge (1995) proposed a similar to 
Heckman selection model to deal with selection bias using the nature of longitudinal data. The 
traditional  Heckman  two-stage  selection  model  does  not  account  for  individual  firm 
heterogeneity  effects  what  might  be  an  important  issue  in  environmental  expenditure 
decisions. These decisions might be based on unobservables such as firm culture, firm social 
responsibility, management background etc. Thus, we adopt the Wooldridge (1995) empirical 





2.1 A selection model of the environmental investment/expenditure decision 
The  first  stage  of  this  analysis  constructs  a  model  of  the  probability  of  environmental 
expenditure/investment  focusing  on  the  role  of  environmental  policy  variables  in  this 
decision. The underlying expenditure/investment decision is modelled as 
   
    i it  z β x γ                   
   
where      
   is  a  latent  variable  that  underlines  an  observed  indicator  variable  that  captures 
whether or not a firm spends according to the following rule:  
       
       
      
              




                           i it  z β x γ                     
 
where    are firm specific time invariant variables;     are firm specific time variant variables; 
    are  firm  specific  time  invariant  unobservables  such  as  firm  culture,  firm  social 
responsibility, management background etc. The first stage uses the cross-sectional probit 
regressions  to  predict  whether  or  not  the  individual  firm  do  environmental 
expenditure/investment in a given period. As the determinants of the investment/expenditure 
decision a number of variables are included in the probit models.  
We also need the variables which are likely to satisfy the necessary exclusion restrictions, i.e. 
they are likely to affect the probability of firm investing in the environment, but are unlikely 
to  affect  changes  in  a  firm’s  investment  levels  except  through  their  effect  on  investment 
decision.  
For the instruments  we use the dummy variables indicating whether individual  firms use 
carbon intensive fuels such as gas or oil. These instruments satisfy the exogeneity/exclusion 
condition as it is unlikely that the particular fuel type usage affects the level of environmental 
investment/expenditure given that we control for other energy/fuel use by individual firms. 
 
2.2 A regression model identifying environmental investment/expenditure determinants 
In the second stage we estimate the fixed effect model: 
                                                      
where      , ... ,     are the inverse Mills ratios estimated in the first selection stage using the 
probit model for each year. The coefficients of the inverse Mills ratios (  ) might suggest that 5 
 
the factors, that predict which firms make decision whether to invest (or make expenditure) 
into environmental measures or not, are correlated with the factors determining how much 
firms  do  invest  or  make  expenditures  related  with  the  environment  protection.  The 
significance  of  the  inverse  Mills  ratios  indicates  that  accounting  for  sample  selection  is 
important. 
2.3 Variables  included  as  potential  determinants  of  firm  environmental 
investment/expenditure  
Based on the earlier empirical and theoretical literature and the available data, we consider 
firm economic situation, capital stock, energy intensity and firm-specific energy prices as 
explanatory variables. We also control for technological characteristics by using six NACE 
industry dummies. Additionally, we control for the introduction of the EU Emission Trading 
System (EU ETS). The descriptive statistics of all variables are presented in Table 1. In turn, 
we provide a brief motivation for including the above explanatory variables in our models. 
In principle, firm’s economic performance is an important determinant of investment as the 
rate of investment might be constrained by the supply of funds (e.g. see a comprehensive 
survey by Jorgenson (1971)). We measure firm’s economic performance as a ratio of firm 
value added and employee number. We expect the coefficient of this explanatory variable to 
be positive.  
Firm size in which firms operate might also affect investment activity. We might think that 
large and monopolistic firms may have fewer incentives to invest and to innovate, whereas 
small firms in competitive markets are forced to be better than their competitors by reducing 
their production costs and developing new products. On the other hand, larger firms are more 
likely to be more polluting and there may be economies of scale in environmental expenditure 
and investment (Haller and Murphy 2012). We use firm’s lagged capital stock (machinery and 
buildings) to account for firm size effects on environmental investment/expenditure.  
We expect firms that are more energy intensive spend more on pollution reduction due to their 
higher pollution levels and associated pollution abatement costs. We measure energy intensity 
as a ratio of energy used in MWh and employee number. Also, we control for energy prices 
by constructing a firm-specific Tornqvist energy price index. We expect that higher energy 
prices should increase the probability of making an investment.  
As mentioned in the introduction, Swedish firms are subject to national and international 
environmental regulations. In Sweden there are three different types of excise duties, which 
are levied on fuels – energy tax, CO2 tax and SO2 tax. Petrol, diesel, oil, kerosene, natural gas 
and coal are directly subject to energy tax, CO2 tax and SO2 tax. The general principle is that 
excise duties are only to be paid if the fuel is used as motor fuel or for heating purposes. Apart 
from these directly excisable fuels, excise duties are also levied on certain other fuels when 
sold or used as motor fuels or for heating purposes. This applies to all mineral oils, fats from 
both vegetable and animal sources and fatty acid methyl esters. Taxable is also any product 
used  as  motor  fuel  and  any  hydrocarbon,  which  is  sold  or  used  for  heating  purposes. 
However,  aviation  spirit  and  jet  fuel  are  not  subject  to  excise  duty  when  used  for  air 6 
 
navigation. Petrol has been taxed since 1924 and diesel since 1937. Energy tax on oil and coal 
used for heating purposes and electricity has been collected since the nineteen fifties. The 
carbon dioxide and sulphur taxes were introduced in 1991. The CO2 tax base rate is presently 
1,05 SEK (about 0,11 euro) per kilo CO2 emitted. However, due to exemptions and special 
rules the actual rate paid by industry is considerably lower (0,15-0,20 SEK) The SO2 tax is 
levied on the sulphur content in the fuel and is based on a tax rate of 30 SEK (3,08 euro) per 
kilo.  
That  these  policies  are  successful  have  been  document  by  several  studies.  For  instance, 
Brännlund and Lundgren (2010), Lundgren and Marklund (2010) and Brännlund et al. (2011) 
study the impact of a CO2 tax on firm level profits and environmental performance during 
1990-2004.  They  find  that  environmental  performance,  in  terms  of  carbon  intensity  in 
production, is  positively correlated with  the CO2 tax, while the impact on profitability is 
ambiguous.  
In addition to the national policies, since 2005 large polluters of CO2 emissions have been 
covered  under  the  European  Union’s  Emission  Trading  System.  Firms  subject  to  these 
regulations have strong incentives to reduce their emissions by contracting their output or by 
employing and/or installing less polluting production technologies.  
To explore the effects of environmental policies introduced by Swedish authorities, we use 
total energy-environmental taxes paid by firms. Unfortunately, these data are available only 
for a very small set of firms and, thus, this variable is excluded from the main models of this 
study. For the EU ETS, we use a dummy variable which identifies whether a firm belongs to 
the EU ETS. Also, to control for the dynamics of CO2 price, we use an average annual price 
of CO2 as well as its variance for the years 2005-2008. Finally, we control for the introduction 
of the EU ETS by using a dummy variable for the 2005-2008 period corresponding for the 
first years of the EU ETS. The interaction term between the ETS-firm dummy and the time 
dummy representing the first four years of the EU ETS will show whether the post-2005 
period for ETS firms was associated with higher environmental expenditure and investment: 
 
                                                                       , 
 




3.  Data 
Our dataset consists of several independent datasets collected and owned by Statistics Sweden 
(SCB).  The  environmental  expenditure  variables  come  from  “Environmental  protection 
expenditure in industry” survey. It has been in place since 1999 but it has become compulsory 
since 2001. The statistics cover total investments in environmental protection and current 
expenditure. The expenditure is broken down between types of costs, environmental domains 
(air, water, waste, biodiversity and landscape, protection of soil and groundwater and other), 7 
 
30 economic activities for industries, and five size classes of numbers of employees (20-49, 
50-249, 250-499, 500-999, more than 1000). The sample frame consists of enterprises with 20 
employees  or  more
1  whose  main  activity  is  in  Min ing  and  quarrying  (NACE  10 -14), 
Manufacturing (NACE 15-36) and Electricity, gas and water supply (NACE 40-41). The total 
sample for each year consists of approximately 1 000 firms. The analysis here focuses on the 
Mining and quarrying and Manufacturing sectors. Survey forms, reports on methods and 
quality as well as aggregates obtained from the data are available at www.scb.se. 
The other necessary  economic,  environmental and energy variables for this study were 
obtained from the other datasets owned by the SCB. Matching of firms across data sets was 
performed using unique firm -level identifiers.
2  Our dataset consists of  more than seven 
thousand observations over the period 1999-2008, about 750 per year.
3  
As  only  a  fraction  of  firms  reports  positive  values  for  environmental  expenditure  and 
investment, we might have sample selection bias since our dependent variables are censored, 
i.e. they can be measured only if an individual firm decides to spend or invest in po llution 
abatement. We will use the  Heckman selection models described above  to deal with this 
problem. 
 
4.  Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables used in this study. Separately, the 
summary statistics are reported for firms that reported positive environmental expenditure and 
investment. During the period of our analysis, 86% of firms reported positive environmental 
expenditure and the share of firms that reported environmental investment was much smaller 
– 44%. On average, firms spent SEK 3 505.6 thousand and invested SEK 4 950.2 thousand. It 
is evident that firms that reported positive environmental investment are on average more 
profitable and capital intensive than firms that reported positive environmental expenditure.  
Firms that report environmental investments are also more energy intensive than other firms. 
The sectoral allocation reveals (see Table 2) that firms in the mining and quarrying sector 
report larger environmental expenditure and investment. Firms in the wood, pulp and paper; 
and chemicals, mineral products and plastic sectors invest more in environmental protection 
than firms in the other sectors.  
                                                           
1 In 2005, due to the administrative burden on enterprises, Statistics Sweden decided to raise the cut off to 
enterprises with 50 employees or more instead of the usual 20 employees. To make comparisons with earlier 
years possible, estimations were made for the size group 20-49 employees. 
2 To the best of our knowledge, this merge of different datasets has not been done before.  
3 Some variables are available for the shorter period.  8 
 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
Variables  Measurement units 
All observations 
 
If envexp > 0 
 
If envinv >0 
Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
 
Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
 
Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Total investment  SEK, thousands  7 560  2 156.2  12 367.1 
 
5346  2 454.8  11 800.4 
 
3293  4 950.2  18 367.1 
Air investment  SEK, thousands  7 560  912.3  6 969.9 
 
5346  1 006.6  6 082.8 
 
3293  2 094.6  10 443.6 
Other investment  SEK, thousands  7 560  1 243.9  8 118.0 
 
5346  1 448.1  8 750.0 
 
3293  2 855.7  12 112.7 
Total expenditure  SEK, thousands  6 224  3 011.1  8 804.4 
 
5346  3 505.6  9 408.4 
 
2653  5 787.0  12 541.1 
R&D expenditure  SEK, thousands  6 224  112.6  867.0 
 
5346  131.0  934.2 
 
2653  213.6  1210.0 
Profitability ratio  SEK per employee  7 530  651 602.9  1 215 244.0 
 
5332  680 463.5  1 377 628.0 
 
3287  743 799.6  1 761 912.0 
Capital  SEK, thousands  7 559  262 775.1  979 509.6 
 
5345  297 683.9  1 059 913.0 
 
3293  489 293.0  1 394 015.0 
Energy intensity  MWh per employee  6 944  219.0  614.1 
 
5064  244.0  677.1 
 
3193  343.4  813.5 
Tornqvist energy price index  Base year 2000  6 953  1.302  0.395 
 
5071  1.360  0.383 
 
3195  1.216  0.379 
ETS firms  dummy variable, 1 if ETS firm  7 560  0.100  0.300 
 
5346  0.114  0.318 
 
3293  0.183  0.387 
Mining and quarrying  dummy variable, 1 if NACE 10-15  7 560  0.017  0.130 
 
5346  0.017  0.129 
 
3293  0.024  0.152 
Food, beverages, textiles and clothing  dummy variable, 1 if NACE 15-19  7 560  0.118  0.323 
 
5346  0.117  0.322 
 
3293  0.114  0.318 
Wood, pulp and paper  dummy variable, 1 if NACE 20-22, 36  7 560  0.226  0.418 
 
5346  0.217  0.412 
 
3293  0.217  0.412 
Chemicals, mineral products and plastic  dummy variable, 1 if NACE 23-26  7 560  0.155  0.362 
 
5346  0.169  0.375 
 
3293  0.185  0.388 
Metal, metal products  dummy variable, 1 if NACE 27-28  7 560  0.136  0.343 
 
5346  0.137  0.344 
 
3293  0.150  0.357 
Machinery and equipment, electronics  dummy variable, 1 if NACE 29-35  7 560  0.347  0.476 
 
5346  0.342  0.474 
 
3293  0.311  0.463 
Total energy and environmental taxes  SEK, thousands  1 151  6 321.6  12 766.6     908  6 301.7  12 009.2     850  7 496.7  14 178.6 9 
 
 
Table 2 Sectoral allocation of environmental expenditure and investment 
Industry 
If envexp > 0 
 
If envinv >0 
Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
 
Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Mining and quarrying  91  12 303.6  27 583.0 
 
78  19 566.2  46 138.7 
Food, beverages, textiles and clothing  627  3 742.4  6 901.4 
 
375  2 722.4  6 492.5 
Wood, pulp and paper  1 160  4 489.4  11 277.5 
 
715  10 074.1  27 727.1 
Chemicals, mineral products and plastic  906  4 579.2  9 233.0 
 
608  5 487.7  12 099.0 
Metal, metal products  733  3 575.9  10 298.2 
 
494  3 492.9  21 459.8 
Machinery and equipment, electronics  1 829  1 802.7  5 637.6     1023  1 455.5  3 838.1 
 
The dynamics of environmental expenditure and investment is presented in Figure 1. It is 
evident that average environmental expenditure increased significantly after the year 2004. It 
is an important question, whether this increase can be explained by the introduction of the EU 
ETS in 2005. Oppositely, average environmental investment has slightly declined since 2005. 
Figure 1 Mean environmental expenditure and investment, 1999-2008 
 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for ETS and non-ETS firms. It is evident that ETS 
firms are larger than other firms in the sample. They are more energy and capital intensive as 
well as more profitable. On average, ETS firms spend more on environment and invest more 







































Table 3 Descriptive statistics for ETS and non-ETS firms.  
Variables  Measurement units 
Non-ETS firms  ETS firms 
Mean  Obs.  Mean  Obs. 
Total investment  SEK, thousands  690.3  6 805  15 369.4  755 
Air investment  SEK, thousands  305.4  6 805  6 383.0  755 
Other investment  SEK, thousands  384.9  6 805  8 986.3  755 
Total expenditure  SEK, thousands  1 355.2  5 584  17 458.3  640 
R&D expenditure  SEK, thousands  62.2  5 584  552.3  640 
Profitability ratio  SEK per employee  615 492.2  6 775  975 643.2  755 
Capital  SEK, thousands  105 345.8  6 804  1 681 515.0  755 
Energy intensity  MWh per employee  116.4  6 196  1 068.8  748 
Energy price index  Base year 2000  1.332  6 205  1.051  748 
Mining and quarrying  dummy variable, 1 if NACE 10-15  0.015  6 805  0.037  755 
Food, beverages, textiles and clothing  dummy variable, 1 if NACE 15-19  0.124  6 805  0.066  755 
Wood, pulp and paper  dummy variable, 1 if NACE 20-22, 36  0.202  6 805  0.444  755 
Chemicals, mineral products and plastic  dummy variable, 1 if NACE 23-26  0.145  6 805  0.249  755 
Metal, metal products  dummy variable, 1 if NACE 27-28  0.137  6 805  0.122  755 
Machinery and equipment, electronics  dummy variable, 1 if NACE 29-35  0.376  6 805  0.082  755 





4.2 First stage regression results 
The estimates of the first stage Heckman selection model are presented in Table 4. We report 
only  the  pooled  probit  models  due  to  space  constraints.
4  The  selection  model  for 
environmental investment in the third column indicates that – other things equal – larger firms 
(in terms of capital) and firms that use carbon intensive fuels as oil and gas are more likely to 
invest. The likelihood that firms do environmental expenditure is determined by a different set 
of factors: more profitable, more energy intensive firms  as well as  firms that use carbon 
intensive fuels have higher probability of incurring environmental expenditure (see column 
1).  
Table 4 First stage pooled Heckman selection models (probit models) 
Variables 
Expenditure    Investment 
TOTAL   R&D    TOTAL   AIR  OTHER 
 
(1)  (2)    (3)  (4)  (5) 
ETS firms  0.116  0.682***    0.321***  0.355***  0.405*** 
 
(0.0959)  (0.0795)    (0.0803)  (0.0759)  (0.0770) 
Profitability (lag)  2.00e-07***  -7.68e-09    -1.06e-08  -2.08e-08  -1.65e-08 
 
(6.01e-08)  (1.63e-08)    (1.63e-08)  (1.58e-08)  (1.64e-08) 
Energy intensity (lag)  0.000230***  8.28e-05*    6.41e-05  0.000134***  8.64e-05** 
 
(6.36e-05)  (4.24e-05)    (4.45e-05)  (4.20e-05)  (4.31e-05) 
Capital (lag)  1.03e-08  1.11e-07***    2.21e-07***  1.36e-07***  1.62e-07*** 
 
(2.37e-08)  (1.94e-08)    (3.62e-08)  (2.28e-08)  (2.75e-08) 
CO2 price  0.0161***  0.00411    -1.39e-05  0.00322  -0.000832 
 
(0.00404)  (0.00383)    (0.00326)  (0.00348)  (0.00328) 
Variance of CO2 price  -0.0176  -0.00128    -0.0172*  -0.0113  -0.0189* 
 
(0.0120)  (0.0113)    (0.00967)  (0.0105)  (0.00978) 
Tornqvist price index (lag)  0.781***  0.176**    -0.532***  -0.502***  -0.463*** 
 
(0.0753)  (0.0751)    (0.0641)  (0.0708)  (0.0642) 
NACE1 (mining)  -0.178  0.239    0.325*  0.190  0.378** 
 
(0.179)  (0.172)    (0.169)  (0.169)  (0.166) 
NACE2 (food, clothes)  -0.0784  -0.225***    -0.101  -0.187***  -0.0812 
 
(0.0715)  (0.0794)    (0.0634)  (0.0694)  (0.0636) 
NACE3 (wood, paper, furniture)  -0.0879  -0.148**    -0.162***  -0.156***  -0.170*** 
 
(0.0588)  (0.0662)    (0.0535)  (0.0589)  (0.0541) 
NACE4 (chemicals, minerals)  0.0805  -0.179**    0.0753  0.152**  0.00493 
 
(0.0685)  (0.0708)    (0.0583)  (0.0613)  (0.0584) 
NACE5 (metals)  -0.0599  -0.272***    0.0894  0.00992  0.0439 
 
(0.0686)  (0.0777)    (0.0612)  (0.0653)  (0.0612) 
Oil dummy (lag)  0.168***  0.144***    0.199***  0.172***  0.188*** 
 
(0.0354)  (0.0367)    (0.0310)  (0.0325)  (0.0308) 
Gas dummy (lag)  0.169***  0.275***    0.373***  0.452***  0.298*** 
 
(0.0423)  (0.0409)    (0.0363)  (0.0367)  (0.0357) 
Constant  -0.469***  -1.563***    0.263***  -0.382***  0.0673 
 
(0.102)  (0.103)    (0.0850)  (0.0931)  (0.0852) 
No. of observations  4,965  4,965    4,965  4,965  4,965 
  Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We are also interested in whether the EU ETS has affected firms’ environmental investment 
and  expenditure.  We  find  that  EU  ETS  firms  are  more  likely  in  making  environmental 
                                                           
4 The first stage probit models used for the second stage fixed effects models must be run separately for each 
year. Then, the inverse Mills ratios are constructed and inputted in the second stage. Thus, each fixed effect 
model has at least eight corresponding probit models. These results can be provided by the authors upon request. 12 
 
 
investment and R&D expenditure decisions (see columns 2-5 in Table 4). The resultant price 
of CO2 in the EU ETS market had a positive and significant effect only on the probability of 
total environmental expenditure (see column 1 in Table 4), but not investment.  
 
4.3 Second stage regression results 
Table 5 and Table 6 show the results of the Heckman selection models without and with 
accounting  for  fixed  effects,  respectively.  The  coefficients  of  the  inverse  Mills  ratios  are 
statistically significant showing that the two firms’ decisions on whether to spend and how 
much to spend are significantly correlated. This indicates that we should use selection models 
to investigate our empirical research questions. 
Table 5 Second stage pooled Heckman selection models 
Variables 
Expenditure  Investment 
TOTAL   R&D  TOTAL   AIR  OTHER 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
ETS firms  3,718***  299.4  7,210***  2,766**  5,216*** 
 
(1,145)  (421.3)  (1,526)  (1,351)  (1,218) 
ETS*Y05  3,924***  416.6  -4,295**  1,682  -5,601*** 
 
(1,186)  (309.6)  (1,758)  (1,556)  (1,326) 
Y05  598.6  -275.0  856.5  1,184  158.0 
 
(755.0)  (298.9)  (1,604)  (1,590)  (1,242) 
Profitability (lag)  -0.000278  0.000957***  0.00349***  0.00109  0.00296*** 
 
(0.000199)  (0.000172)  (0.000860)  (0.000762)  (0.000660) 
Energy intensity (lag)  0.855  -0.120  4.388***  2.516***  1.733*** 
 
(0.531)  (0.127)  (0.702)  (0.591)  (0.535) 
Capital (lag)  0.00392***  1.57e-05  0.00136***  3.31e-05  0.00115*** 
 
(0.000206)  (4.76e-05)  (0.000268)  (0.000229)  (0.000207) 
CO2 price  -115.0**  1.919  23.75  -3.271  19.86 
 
(48.05)  (14.77)  (80.30)  (77.68)  (62.01) 
Variance of CO2 price  135.5  72.39**  116.2  28.56  139.2 
 
(116.1)  (36.25)  (200.1)  (190.8)  (155.7) 
Tornqvist price index (lag)  -5,150***  86.44  -1,675  -2,511*  -433.8 
 
(1,183)  (313.5)  (1,528)  (1,496)  (1,169) 
NACE1 (mining)  6,215***  780.6*  9,343***  2,612  7,718*** 
 
(1,899)  (453.9)  (2,600)  (2,418)  (1,934) 
NACE2 (food, clothes)  1,581**  -437.2  -115.1  -157.6  377.9 
 
(765.2)  (270.4)  (1,229)  (1,254)  (944.3) 
NACE3 (wood, paper, furniture)  -406.7  -461.3*  2,610**  1,232  2,584*** 
 
(655.2)  (239.6)  (1,105)  (1,091)  (864.0) 
NACE4 (chemicals, minerals)  1.613  90.01  -836.9  -875.7  -320.2 
 
(719.5)  (243.6)  (1,112)  (1,073)  (862.2) 
NACE5 (metals)  1,235*  -113.3  -670.9  299.2  -641.5 
 
(739.5)  (268.3)  (1,162)  (1,134)  (891.4) 
Lambda  -15,290***  170.2  -4,440**  -1,492  -3,137* 
 
(3,126)  (465.6)  (2,148)  (1,640)  (1,838) 
Constant  13,066***  -419.6  3,428  4,541*  1,449 
 
(2,529)  (956.0)  (2,138)  (2,371)  (1,840) 
No. of. obs. (uncensored)  3,992  787  2,367  1,422  2,059 




One of the most interesting research questions is whether the introduction of the EU ETS in 
2005 has had any effect on firms’ environmental behaviour. To explore this question we use 
the interaction term between the dummy representing the EU ETS time period (2005-2008) 
and the dummy variable indicating whether the individual firm was covered by this scheme. 
Since it was not a voluntary scheme, we can consider the EU ETS as an exogenous factor 
which can allow us to identify the causal policy effect. 
The fixed effects and pooled Heckman selection models produce very similar estimates. The 
results from Table 5 and Table 6 indicate that the EU ETS policy had different effects on 
environmental  expenditure  and  investment:  the  effect  on  environmental  expenditure  is 
positive  (column  1),  while  it  is  negative  on  other  than  air  pollution  related  investment 
(column 5). We might think that  the EU ETS encouraged ETS firms to redistribute their 
environmental expenses, i.e. to postpone or decrease environmental investment in other than 
air related areas and to increase environmental expenditure in order to comply with the EU 
ETS regulations. For instance, Jaraitė et al. (2010) have found that internal (staff) and capital 
costs accounted for most of the expenditure associated with the introduction of the EU ETS in 
Ireland.  
We also included the EU ETS allowance price and its volatility to extend our analysis on EU 
ETS effects. We find no evidence that EU ETS price or its volatility had a significant impact 
on the environmental investment or expenditure levels perhaps indicating that this price was 
too low to trigger any changes in firms’ expenditure and investment decisions.   
Table 6. Fixed effects Heckman selection models 
VARIABLES 
Expenditure  Investment 
TOTAL   R&D  TOTAL   AIR  OTHER 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
ETS*Y05  3,809***  237.5  -3,154  2,656  -5,435*** 
 
(418.2)  (398.0)  (2,043)  (2,132)  (1,565) 
Y05  4.231  -219.1  344.9  2,005  -222.9 
 
(296.2)  (386.2)  (1,956)  (2,359)  (1,571) 
Profitability (lag)  0.00123***  0.000854  0.00392*  -0.000332  0.00737*** 
 
(0.000371)  (0.000726)  (0.00231)  (0.00400)  (0.00179) 
Energy intensity (lag)  1.183  1.052  -9.507**  -17.94**  -5.709 
 
(1.440)  (1.158)  (4.043)  (8.167)  (3.751) 
Capital (lag)  0.000477  -0.000296  -0.00697***  -0.00485***  -0.00142 
 
(0.000390)  (0.000671)  (0.00124)  (0.00137)  (0.000891) 
CO2 price  -10.75  6.560  64.34  -6.847  53.43 
 
(14.27)  (16.86)  (90.16)  (104.8)  (71.97) 
Variance of CO2 price  25.31  56.74  -79.50  -51.00  30.59 
 
(34.99)  (41.38)  (217.3)  (243.2)  (175.1) 
Tornqvist price index (lag)  1,246*  420.2  5,197  5,568  1,784 
 
(660.7)  (1,556)  (3,722)  (3,881)  (2,144) 
Inverse Mills ratios  y  y  y  y  y 
Constant  1,875**  -4,041  12,710***  16,610***  10,633*** 
 





    No. of. obs. (uncensored)  3,992  787  2,367  1,422  2,059 
R-squared (within)  0.055  0.087  0.029  0.056  0.026 
Number of firms  1,060  281  766  535  704 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 14 
 
 
The  fixed  effect  models  produce  the  opposite  than  expected  signs  for  capital  and  other 
potential environmental investment/expenditure determinants’ coefficients. Baltagi and Pinnoi 
(1995) explain that this may happen as fixed effects estimate the short-run effects and pooled 
OLS models produce the expected sign, suggesting the long-run impact. Thus, it is important 
to consider both estimation methods.  
Our capital variable, i.e. buildings and machinery, is used as a proxy for the firm size. As 
expected, we find that firm size is an important factor explaining the amount of environmental 
expenditure  and  investment  (see  Table  5).  However  in  the  fixed  effect  models  we  get  a 
negative and significant relationship between investment and capital size (see Table 6). As 
mentioned above, this might be explained by the fact that fixed effect models reflect more 
short-run relationships.  
A similar argument can be also applied for other variables such as firm energy intensity. In 
the  long-run,  firm  energy  intensity  is  a  significant  and  positive  factor  determining 
environmental investment which is consistent with the economic logic. However in the short-
run,  the  increased  energy  intensity  potentially  means  changes  in  production  processes, 
increases in conventional capital investment and additional expenses that could encourage 
firms to postpone their environmental expenditure and investment.  
We also find that firm economic performance is an important factor determining the amount 
of firm’s environmental investment and expenditure. As expected the availability of the funds 
allows firms to invest in environmental projects.  
As Swedish firms are also subject to the strict national environmental regulations, they have 
strong incentives to reduce their emissions by contracting their output or by employing less 
polluting  production  technologies.  To  explore  how  national  environmental  policies  have 
affected firm environmental expenditure and investment, we use total energy-environmental 
taxes paid by firms. The results in Table 7 show that taxes had a significant and positive effect 
on firm environmental and R&D expenditure, but the effects on environmental investment are 
not clear and needs further research using more extensive datasets. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
This paper investigates the determinants of environmental expenditure and investment. The 
two-stage Heckman selection models are estimated using a panel dataset of Swedish industrial 
firms tracked from 1999 to 2008. We find that firms that use carbon intensive fuels such as oil 
and gas are more likely to spend to and invest in the environment. More profitable and more 
energy intensive firms are more likely to incur environmental expenditure. Additionally, ETS 
firms are expected to spend on environmental R&D. Once the decision to commit resources 
has  been  taken,  ETS  firms  during  the  first  four  years  of  the  EU  ETS  have  higher 
environmental expenditure. As regards environmental investment we find that larger firms, 
and ETS firms are more likely to invest. ETS firms are also probable to invest on reducing air 
pollution  problems.  The  effect  of  the  EU  ETS  is  negative  on  the  level  of  other  than  air 
pollution related investment, which is opposite to the effect on environmental expenditure. A 
reasonable  explanation  is  that  the  EU  ETS  encouraged  firms  to  restructure  their 15 
 
 
environmental expenses  by  postponing environmental  investment  in  other than air related 
areas  and  increasing  environmental  expenditure  in  order  to  comply  with  the  EU  ETS 
regulation. The role of CO2 price was irrelevant in all models. 
Table 7 Heckman selection models with taxes 
Variables 
Expenditure  Investment 
TOTAL   R&D  TOTAL   AIR  OTHER 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Total taxes (lag)  0.219**  0.101***  0.0279  -0.0185  -0.0530 
 
(0.107)  (0.0136)  (0.110)  (0.0773)  (0.0865) 
ETS firms  2,177  275.2  2,245  1,383  2,235 
 
(3,488)  (708.8)  (4,388)  (3,241)  (3,225) 
ETS*Y05  4,956  862.6  -2,570  2,835  -4,494 
 
(4,150)  (598.1)  (4,943)  (4,295)  (3,561) 
Y05  -1,631  -1,303**  -2,180  129.4  -2,320 
 
(4,762)  (664.0)  (6,096)  (5,375)  (4,342) 
Profitability (lag)  -0.00141  0.000850***  0.00396  0.000894  0.00340 
 
(0.00234)  (0.000270)  (0.00299)  (0.00204)  (0.00224) 
Energy intensity (lag)  -0.563  -0.165  1.320  1.560  -0.681 
 
(1.512)  (0.158)  (1.740)  (1.256)  (1.363) 
Capital (lag)  0.00379***  -2.87e-05  0.00101  -0.000101  0.000975 
 
(0.000562)  (7.25e-05)  (0.000779)  (0.000520)  (0.000615) 
CO2 price  -303.0  4.716  71.00  46.19  -10.36 
 
(260.4)  (25.72)  (278.0)  (214.6)  (205.1) 
Variance of CO2 price  512.1  126.3*  595.7  174.3  667.5 
 
(615.5)  (64.55)  (730.3)  (534.5)  (584.1) 
Tornqvist price index (lag)  -10,757  680.6  -5,413  -7,273  -1,790 
 
(7,219)  (670.5)  (6,134)  (4,450)  (4,488) 
NACE1 (mining)  13,124*  -125.0  21,068***  5,162  17,626*** 
 
(6,840)  (717.3)  (7,509)  (5,790)  (5,481) 
NACE2 (food, clothes)  2,965  -1,153*  2,044  -37.33  2,375 
 
(4,891)  (612.7)  (5,682)  (4,336)  (4,262) 
NACE3 (wood, paper, furniture)  -1,227  -440.1  13,847**  3,426  11,363*** 
 
(4,465)  (539.6)  (5,403)  (4,145)  (3,893) 
NACE4 (chemicals, minerals)  1,762  -216.6  1,712  -1,358  2,331 
 
(4,335)  (597.4)  (4,991)  (3,893)  (3,711) 
NACE5 (metals)  5,128  -349.0  1,843  2,655  2,937 
 
(4,731)  (607.5)  (5,848)  (4,203)  (4,047) 
Lambda  -32,966**  1,061  -26,625  -3,014  -20,893 
 
(16,802)  (1,041)  (16,675)  (7,379)  (13,757) 
Constant  25,572*  -2,086  15,668  11,354  10,719 
 
(14,805)  (2,061)  (11,265)  (8,941)  (10,087) 
No. of observations (uncensored)  794  595  691  514  637 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Firm  economic  performance  is  another  important  factor  determining  the  amount  of 
environmental  investment  and  expenditure.  This  corroborates  the  idea  that  environmental 
investment  and  expenditure  to  some  extent  are  motivated  by  strategic  reasons  and  as  a 
consequence integrated with a good economic performance (Heal 2008).  16 
 
 
The analysis of the small sub-sample of our dataset reveals that environmental-energy taxes 
seem  to  motivate  the  level  of  environmental  and  R&D  expenditure,  but  the  effect  on 
investment is not clear and needs further research.  
Overall, an important finding of our econometric analysis is that environmental regulation 
both on the national and international levels are highly relevant motivations for environmental 
expenditure  and  investment.  Whether  these  policies  have  been  sufficient  to  drive 
environmental innovation has to be investigated by future research.  
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